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Abstract
Rank-order tournaments are usually modeled simultaneously. However,
real tournaments are often sequential. We show that agents’ strategic be-
havior in sequential-move tournaments signiﬁcantly diﬀer from the one in
simultaneous-move tournaments: In a sequential-move tournament with het-
erogeneous agents, there may be either a ﬁrst-mover or a second-mover ad-
vantage. Under certain conditions the ﬁrst acting agent chooses a preemp-
tively high eﬀort so that the following agent gives up. The principal is able
to prevent preemptive behavior in equilibrium, but he will not implement
ﬁrst-best eﬀorts although the agents are risk neutral.
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11 Introduction
Rank-order tournaments have been extensively discussed in the literature.1
In the basic model, two agents compete for tournament prizes by choosing
their eﬀort levels simultaneously. The agent who produces the highest out-
put receives the winner prize whereas the other agent gets the loser prize.
The main result of this literature is that, under certain circumstances, the
principal can design tournament prizes such that the agents choose the ﬁrst-
best eﬀort level even in cases where agents’ eﬀorts and outputs are unveri-
ﬁable. In these cases, standard compensation schemes like bonus payments
or piece rates are non-contractible. The principal would always be able to
save labor costs by claiming that the agents’ outputs were low. Tournament
incentive schemes, however, consists of contractible prizes that have been
ﬁxed in advance so that the principal cannot gain by misrepresenting the
agents’ performances (Malcomson 1984, 1986). This explains why tourna-
ments are often observed in practice: For example, sales persons compete
for bonus payments (Mantrala, Kraﬀt and Weitz 2000). Employees compete
in job promotion tournaments to reach a better paid job on a higher rank
in the ﬁrm’s hierarchy (e.g., Baker, Gibbs and Holmström 1994a, 1994b).2
Managers of the same industry compete against each other in a kind of tour-
nament due to relative performance compensation (Antle and Smith 1986,
Gibbons and Murphy 1990, Eriksson 1999). Tournaments can be even ob-
served in connection with broiler production (Knoeber 1989, Knoeber and
1See, e.g., Lazear and Rosen (1981), Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz (1983), Green and Stokey
(1983), O’Keefe, Viscusi, and Zeckhauser (1984), Rosen (1986), McLaughlin (1988), Lazear
(1989).
2The contractibility property of tournaments may explain the major puzzle of Baker,
Jensen, and Murphy (1988) why promotion- instead of bonus-based incentive schemes are
so often observed in practice.
2Thurman 1994). Moreover, further advantages have been attributed to tour-
naments; especially, low measurement costs, and the ﬁltering of common
noise.
The common assumption of the previous tournament models is that the
competing agents choose their eﬀort levels simultaneously. This assumption
may hold in some contexts. In many other contexts, however, agents do not
decide about their eﬀorts at the same time. Real tournaments (e.g., promo-
tion tournaments or tournaments between salesmen) show that agents often
act sequentially and may be able to observe their competitors’ eﬀorts when
deciding on their own eﬀort. Hence, the agents may get some information
during the tournament, which will inﬂuence their succeeding eﬀort choices.
Obviously, these features cannot be discussed within a simultaneous-move
tournament. In addition, some tournaments are even organized sequentially
in practice, which holds for diverse sport contests (see, for example, Ehren-
berg and Bognanno [1990a, 1990b] for an empirical analysis of golf tourna-
ments).
In this paper, we consider tournaments in which the agents are assumed to
choose their eﬀorts sequentially. In a two-agent tournament, one of the agents
ﬁrst chooses his eﬀort. After that, the other agent observes this eﬀort and
then has to decide about his own eﬀort level. We show that this sequential-
move tournament substantially diﬀers from the standard simultaneous-move
tournament. In particular, the sequential-move tournament allows for ad-
ditional strategic behavior by the agents: Either, the ﬁrst acting agent can
use his position as Stackelberg leader to discourage the second agent. He is
even able to choose a preemptively high eﬀort level. Or, the second acting
agent can use his role as Stackelberg follower to outrival the ﬁrst agent. The
analysis shows that, as a necessary condition for preemption, marginal costs
3have to be positive at the origin or, alternatively, luck has to be distributed
over a ﬁnite interval.
There are parallels to the discussion of Dixit (1987) and Baye and Shin
(1999) about precommitment in contests. As Dixit (1987, p. 892) states
homogeneous players lead to the symmetric simultaneous-move outcome in a
game where players choose their eﬀorts sequentially. However, Baye and Shin
(1999) show that this result will only hold if the contest success function sat-
isﬁes a technical third-order condition. Our results highlight that sequential-
move tournaments fundamentally diﬀer from simultaneous-move ones: In our
model, there will never be a symmetric equilibrium in the sequential-move
tournament as it is always the case in the simultaneous-move tournament
given homogeneity. Of course, there is at least one crucial diﬀerence be-
tween our model and the Dixit model: Dixit and Baye and Shin analyze
contests with linear costs whereas we consider tournaments with convex cost
functions.
There are also some parallels to the literature on preemptive behavior
in other setups. Fudenberg et al. (1983) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1985)
discuss preemptive behavior in R&D races, whereas Fishman (1988, 1989)
considers preemptive takeover bidding. Our paper is most related to the
literature on preemptive behavior in (rent-seeking) contests (see Leininger
and Yang 1994; Baik 1998; Weimann et al. 2000).
Besides the diﬀerence with respect to the players’ cost functions there is at
least one further diﬀerence between contests and tournaments. Often prizes
are exogenously given in contests. On the contrary, prizes are endogenous
and optimally chosen by the principal in tournaments. More generally, the
most important diﬀerence to the contest literature is that the principal can
choose the design of the tournament. The analysis shows that considering
4heterogeneous tournaments the underdog will drop out of the competition
if the spread between winner and loser prize is suﬃciently large and that
the principal prevents this outcome by choosing an optimal prize spread.
Moreover, the principal does not implement ﬁrst-best eﬀorts, although both
agents are risk neutral.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the general
model of a sequential-move tournament. In Section 3 we derive necessary
conditions for preemptive behavior in the general model. Section 4 considers
the special case of uniformly distributed luck and quadratic costs in order to
derive explicit solutions.3 Section 5 concludes.
2T h e g e n e r a l m o d e l
We follow the model of Lazear and Rosen (1981) and consider a tournament
between two risk neutral agents. According to the ranks of their outputs the
agents receive a winner prize w1 or a loser prize w2,w h e r ew1 >w 2.T h e
output qi of agent i (i = A,B) is given by the linear production function
qi = ei + εi (1)
where ei ≥ 0 denotes agent i’s eﬀort and εi an exogenous error term. The
error terms εA and εB are assumed to be independently and identically
distributed (i.i.d. assumption). Let the diﬀerence of εA and εB be de-
noted by Y := εB − εA with distribution function FY (·) and density fY (·).
Note that the convolution fY (·) is symmetric around zero, which implies
FY (−y)=1− FY (y). The principal, who is also risk neutral, is assumed
3For a discussion of sequential-move tournaments in which the agents’ outputs mostly
depend on luck rather than eﬀort see Jost (2000).
5to observe neither ei nor εi, but he can observe the unveriﬁable output qi.4
Eﬀort ei entails some costs for agent i. These costs can be described in mon-
etary terms by the function ci (ei) with ci (0) = 0, c0
i (ei) > 0 and c00
i (ei) > 0,
∀ei > 0. The subscripts of the cost functions indicate that agents are allowed
to be heterogeneous. Hence, we may have a mixed tournament between a
less talented agent with a steeper or more convex cost function and a more
able agent whose cost function is less steep. We can deﬁne that agent i is
less talented than agent j if c0
i (ei) >c 0
j (ej) and c00
i (ei) >c 00
j (ej). The prin-
cipal maximizes his expected surplus, i.e. the sum of the expected outputs
(E (qA)+E (qB)) minus the labor costs w1+w2. According to this objective
function he chooses appropriate tournament prizes to generate optimal in-
centives for the two agents. Each agent maximizes his expected tournament
prize minus his eﬀort costs ci (ei).I fa g e n ti (i = A,B) decides to participate
in the tournament, he will at least receive his reservation utility ¯ u ≥ 0.
We consider the following three-stage game (see Figure 1).
[Figure 1]
In stage 1 the principal decides about the tournament prizes w1 and w2,a n d
eﬀort level implementation. In stage 2, agent A chooses eA. In stage 3, agent
B observes eA a n dt h e nc h o o s e seB. The realizations of εA and εB are not
known by either agent when exerting eﬀort. After the principal has observed
qA and qB, the most successful agent gets w1, whereas the other receives w2.
4By the assumption of unveriﬁable outcomes we rule out the possibility that the prin-
cipal can induce proper incentives by using individual incentive schemes like piece rates.
63 Preemptive behavior as equilibrium out-
come in the general model
To focus on preemptive behavior as equilibrium outcome consider more closely
the behavior of the two agents. Given agent A chooses eA in stage 2, agent
B then chooses eB in stage 3 to maximize
EUB (eB)=w2 + ∆w · prob{qA <q B} − cB (eB)
= w2 + ∆w · [1 − FY (eA − eB)] − cB (eB). (2)
with ∆w := w1 − w2 as prize spread. Let e∗
B = e∗
B (eA) describe B’s best
response. Agent A’s objective function then is given by
EUA (eA)=w2 + ∆w · FY (eA − e
∗
B) − cA (eA) (3)
In order to use his ﬁrst-mover position to gain a strategic advantage, A
may have the opportunity to preempt the second mover B, i.e. to choose a
suﬃciently high eﬀort so that B prefers to drop out of the tournament by
choosing zero eﬀort instead of competing against A. S u c hp r e e m p t i o nw i l l
be an equilibrium outcome, if agent B prefers to drop out at the third stage
for a given eﬀort of agent A,a n di fA prefers to choose a preemptive eﬀort
at the second stage given B’s reaction function. Let eA,pre denote agent A’s
preemptive eﬀort in this case. Then, at the third stage, agent B will drop
out, if
w2+∆w·[1 − FY (eA,pre)] ≥ w2+∆w·[1 − FY (eA,pre − eB)]−cB (eB) ,∀eB.
At the second stage, agent A will choose preemption if
w2+∆w·FY (eA,pre)−cA (eA,pre) ≥ w2+∆w·FY (eA − e
∗
B)−cA (eA) ,∀eA.
Altogether, we obtain the following result:
7Proposition 1 A preemptive equilibrium (eA,pre,0) exists if and only if
∆w[FY (eA,pre) − FY (eA,pre − eB)] ≤ cB (eB),∀eB, and (4)
cA (eA,pre) − cA (eA) ≤ ∆w[FY (eA,pre) − FY (eA − e
∗
B)],∀eA. (5)
According to condition (4), agent B will choose to give up, if the addi-
tional expected return from competing is lower or equal than the associated
costs that can be saved from non-competing. Condition (5) shows that agent
A prefers to choose his preemptive eﬀort if additional costs from preemption
a r ea tm o s ta sh i g ha st h ea d d i t i o n a le x p e c t e dr e t u r n .N o t et h a tap r e e m p t i v e
outcome of a tournament with heterogeneous agents will be most likely if the
ﬁrst mover is the favorite and the second mover the underdog: The more con-
vex cB (·) the larger the right-hand side of (4), and the less convex cA (·) the
smaller the left-hand side of (5). In this situation, the drop-out gains for B,
cB (eB),a r eq u i t el a r g e ,w h e r e a sA’s preemption costs, cA (eA,pre) − cA (eA),
are not prohibitively high.
Typically, if agent B drops out for a given value of agent A’s eﬀort, he
will also give up for even larger values of A’s eﬀort so that the right-hand
side of (5) is positive and we can combine conditions (4) and (5) to
cA (eA,pre) − cA (eA)




FY (eA,pre) − FY (eA,pre − eB)
,∀eA,∀eB.
(6)
Condition (6) emphasizes that a preemptive equilibrium exists for interme-
diate values of the prize spread ∆w. The intuition for this result can be
explained by the ambiguity of ∆w in case of preemption: On the one hand,
a large prize spread leads to high expected returns for B from competing
with A, which works against preemption. In addition, eﬀort incentives and,
therefore, eﬀort costs will be quite high for agent A if the prize spread is
large. On the other hand, a small value of ∆w implies restricted gains from
8preemption for A, which also makes a preemptive outcome unlikely.
By inspection of (4) and (5) a necessary condition for a preemptive equi-
librium can be given:
Corollary For the existence of a preemptive equilibrium at least one of the
following two conditions must hold: (1) c0
B (0) > 0,( 2 )εB −εA is distributed
over a ﬁnite interval.
If c0
B (0) = 0 and fY (eA − eB) (i.e., the marginal probability of winning)
is always positive,5 a preemptive equilibrium cannot exist. Instead of drop-
ping out, agent B would always prefer to exert at least marginal positive
eﬀort, since for eB =0marginal costs c0
B (eB) are zero but marginal gains
∆wfY (eA − eB) are strictly positive. In other words, condition (4) can never
be met. Hence, we have two possible types of preemptive equilibria: (1)
Given eA,pre agent B drops out, since competition would be too costly (type-
I preemption with c0
B (0) > 0); (2) Given eA,pre agent B gives up, since luck
is restricted and eA,pre shifts fY (·) out of the ﬁnite interval so that mar-
ginal gains from competition are zero for agent B (type-II preemption with
εB − εA being distributed over a ﬁnite interval). In either case, preemptive
eﬀort eA,pre h a st ob es u ﬃciently high to make B give up.
Of course, the existence of preemptive equilibria in the general model
introduced in Section 2 depends on the speciﬁc shape of the agents’ cost
functions and on the speciﬁc shape of the distribution function FY (·). Since
Leininger and Yang (1994), who use Tullock’s (1980) contest success function6
and a linear cost function as speciﬁc assumptions, already considered the
5This holds, e.g., for the case in which εA and εB are independently and normally
distributed so that εB − εA also follows a normal distribution.
6Note that Tullock’s contest success function corresponds to a probit or tournament
model with exponentionally distributed noise; see, e.g., Loury (1979).
9case of type-I preemption we will focus for the rest of this paper on type-II
preemption.
4 A special case: quadratic costs and uni-
formly distributed noise
In order to analyze type-II preemption and to derive explicit solutions for
the agents’ equilibrium behavior, we now use concrete speciﬁcations for the
probability distribution and the agents’ cost functions. In particular, we
assume that luck is distributed uniformly and the agents have quadratic costs
cA(eA)=0 .5τke2
A and cB(eB)=0 .5ke2
B with τ > 0 and k>0.H e r e t h e
parameter τ characterizes the types of the two agents. If τ =1 ,w ew i l lh a v e
a tournament with homogeneous agents. If τ < 1 (τ > 1), we will consider
heterogeneous competition with agent A being the favorite (underdog) and
B the underdog (favorite). When luck εi is uniformly distributed over [−¯ ε,¯ ε]
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2 if 0 <y≤ 2¯ ε
1 if y>2¯ ε.
(8)
7For construction of this convolution see analogously Kräkel (2000).
10As a benchmark we can derive ﬁrst-best eﬀorts which are deﬁned as those












as ﬁrst-best eﬀorts. To ensure that these eﬀorts lie in the interval [0,2¯ ε],
we assume throughout the paper that agents’ marginal eﬀort costs are suﬃ-








i(2¯ ε) (i = A,B), i.e.
1 < 2τk¯ ε and 1 < 2k¯ ε. (10)
We will now consider the outcome of the sequential-move tournament, in
which agent A moves ﬁrst whereas agent B follows at the next stage:8
Proposition 2 Given uniformly distributed noise and quadratic costs, there
exists a critical-value function ˆ τ(∆w) such that the following results hold:









2τ¯ ε∆w(4k¯ ε2 + ∆w)
τ∆w2 +( 2 τ − 1)4∆wk¯ ε2 +1 6 τk2¯ ε4. (12)









2τ¯ ε∆w(4k¯ ε2 − ∆w)
τ∆w2 − (2τ − 1)4∆wk¯ ε2 +1 6 τk2¯ ε4.( 1 4 )








B =0 . (15)
8For the concrete shape of the critical-value function ˆ τ(∆w) see the appendix.
11Proof. See the appendix.
Note ﬁr s tt h a t ,t h ep r i n c i p a lw i l ln o tb ea b l et oi m p l e m e n tﬁrst-best
eﬀorts for both agents, if he wants to do this, which becomes obvious by
inspection of (9) and (11)—(15). Figure 2 illustrates the optimal behavior of
the two agents according to Proposition 2.
[Figure 2]
For suﬃciently large values of τ, the second mover B is more aggressive — in
the sense of choosing higher eﬀorts — than the ﬁrst mover A. Interestingly, as
Figure 2 shows, this may even happen for τ < 1, i.e. for situations in which
agent B is the underdog and A the favorite. However, for suﬃciently small
values of τ,t h eﬁrst mover A exerts more eﬀort than the second mover B.
According to Figure 2, there exist parameter values τ > 1,w h e r et h em o r e
aggressive player A is the underdog and the less aggressive one, B,i st h e
favorite. Note that there will never be a symmetric equilibrium if the agents
are homogeneous (i.e., if τ =1).
Most interestingly, if the prize spread ∆w is suﬃciently large, the ag-
gressive player A chooses a preemptive eﬀort so that the second mover B
drops out. Such preemptive behavior can only happen if τ is suﬃciently
small which is just in line with the ﬁndings of Proposition 1. Note that the
result concerning the suﬃciently large prize spread does not contradict the
intuition given in the discussion of condition (6), which describes a closed
interval for preemptive values of ∆w. In the parametric case of Proposi-
tion 2, there is the same trade-oﬀ as in the discussion above: A high prize
spread ∆w implies large gains from preemption, but also high incentives for
both players and, therefore, high eﬀort costs for A when preempting agent
B. Technically, as Figure 2 and the functional form of ˆ τ (∆w) show (see the
appendix), the critical-value function ˆ τ (∆w) is monotonically decreasing for
12∆w ≥ 4k¯ ε2. Hence, if ∆w becomes arbitrarily large, τ has to be very small
— i.e. heterogeneity has to be very large with agent A b e i n gac l e a rf a v o r i t e
— for preemption to be an equilibrium outcome in the tournament.
To summarize, preemptive behavior will be optimal for agent A,i fh e
is suﬃciently more talented than agent B and if the additional gains from
preemption, ∆w, are quite large. Moreover, note that there also exist pa-
rameter values for ∆w slightly above 4k¯ ε2 for which agent A preempts the
second mover B, although A is the underdog (i.e., τ > 1). In addition, the
preemption condition ∆w ≥ 4k¯ ε2 also indicates that preemptive behavior
will only be optimal, if the cost parameter k and the impact of luck ¯ ε are not
too large. Of course, if the cost function is too convex, preemptive behavior
will be prohibitively costly for agent A. Similarly, if ¯ ε is large, agent A has
to exert a very high eﬀort to shift fY (·) out of the interval [−2¯ ε,2¯ ε] which
again would be prohibitively expensive for A.
The results of Proposition 2 only highlight which agent is the more ag-
gressive one. Now we compare the agents’ expected utilities for the diﬀerent
situations to check whether the agents can realize ﬁrst-mover or second-mover
advantages. The preemption case is obvious. Here agent A shifts fY (·) out
of the interval [−2¯ ε,2¯ ε] so that B’s winning probability is zero and he ends
up with the loser prize w2 whereas A gets an expected utility strictly greater
than w2.L e tˆ τ(∆w) denote the critical-value function of Proposition 2. Then
we obtain the following result:
Proposition 3 Given uniformly distributed noise and quadratic costs, if τ ≤
ˆ τ(∆w) we will have EUA (e∗
A,e ∗
B) >E U B (e∗
A,e ∗
B),but for τ > ˆ τ(∆w) the
opposite holds.
Proof. See the appendix.
13Proposition 3 shows that agent A is better oﬀ than agent B as long as
τ is suﬃciently small, but B’s expected utility exceeds the one of agent A
for relative large values of τ. More interestingly, as Figure 2 shows there
are parameter constellations (∆w,τ) with ∆w n o tt o ol a r g ei nw h i c ha g e n t
A has a higher expected utility than agent B although τ > 1, i.e. agent
A is the underdog and B the favorite.9 In these cases we can speak of a
ﬁr s t - m o v e ra d v a n t a g e .O nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,f o rs u ﬃciently large values of ∆w
there are also constellations in which B’s expected utility is larger than A’s
despite τ < 1 so that the underdog B realizes a second-mover advantage.
T h ei n t u i t i o nf o rt h e s er e s u l t sc o m e sf r o mt h ef a c tt h a tt h ei m p a c to fτ —
i.e., the impact of heterogeneity — diminishes as ∆w becomes large so that
incentives are mainly determined by the prize spread. Figure 2 shows that
the number of parameter constellations which correspond to a ﬁrst-mover or
a second-mover advantage increases with increasing ∆w.
At the ﬁrst stage of the three-stage game, the principal chooses his optimal
tournament prizes. The following result can be derived:
Proposition 4 Given uniformly distributed noise and quadratic costs, the
principal optimally chooses ∆w<4k¯ ε2 which implements positive eﬀorts for
both agents.
Proof. See the appendix.
According to Proposition 4 the principal prefers a relatively small prize
spread, which serves two purposes: On the one hand, labor costs are ﬁxed
on a moderate level. On the other hand, the principal prevents agent A from
preempting agent B. Hence, concerning the complete three-stage game with
optimally chosen prizes, preemptive behavior is never an equilibrium out-
come. As the proof of Proposition 4 shows, preemption would be completely
9Note that the increasing part of ˆ τ(∆w) is always larger than 1.
14detrimental for the principal, because it leads to strictly negative proﬁts.
When studying tournaments with destructive behavior, Lazear (1989) shows
that from the principal’s viewpoint it may be beneﬁcial to choose a low
prize spread ∆w to decrease the agents’ incentives for sabotaging each other.
Our analysis gives another argument for choosing a low ∆w in practice: By
choosing a low prize spread the principal can prevent agent A from exerting
preemptive eﬀort.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we analyzed sequential-move tournaments between two het-
erogeneous agents in which preemptive behavior by the ﬁrst acting agent is
possible. As a necessary condition for preemption, either marginal costs have
to be positive at the origin or luck has to be distributed over a ﬁnite inter-
val. Using a parameterized model we then showed that preemption will be
only possible if the spread between the winner the loser prize is suﬃciently
large. However, the principal who anticipates possible preemptive behavior
optimally chooses a small prize spread that prevents preemption.
An interesting question remains with respect to the agents’ strategic be-
havior in more general dynamic tournaments: Even if in practice the principal
can separate the agents so that their decisions are independent, real tour-
naments are of repeated nature. That is, the entire tournament consists of
several stages and at each stage the agents play a simultaneous-move tour-
nament. Before the next stage, the agents observe their competitors’ eﬀorts
in the last stage. From the analysis of this paper, one would expect that if
the prize spread is suﬃciently large, strategic behavior by the agents will be
possible. This strategic behavior might include a preemptive eﬀort by the
15ﬁrst acting agent. It is, however, also possible that leapfrogging might occur:
Although one agent is behind in total output, he might choose with some
small probability an eﬀort level such that he leaves his competitor behind.
16Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :
We analyze the sequential-move tournament using backward induction:
(1) Given the eﬀort eA of agent A,w eﬁrst consider agent B’s optimal re-
sponse e∗
B (eA) at stage 3. (2) Given this reaction function, we solve for the
optimal eﬀort level e∗
A of agent A at stage 2.
(1) Agent B’s optimal reaction e∗
B (eA):
Given eA agent B chooses e∗
B = e∗
B (eA) to maximize his expected utility.
Using the ﬁrst-order condition agent B will react according to





To check the second-order condition for a maximum suppose that e∗
B <e A.
Then y = eA − e∗






satisﬁed as long as
∆w<4k¯ ε
2 (A2)
holds, i.e. the marginal cost function is steeper than the left-hand tail of the
triangular density (times ∆w). Alternatively, suppose that e∗
B >e A. Then
y = eA−e∗






satisﬁed. Note that condition (A2) is equivalent to e∗ < 2¯ ε,w h e r ee∗ denotes
the symmetric equilibrium eﬀort in case of a simultaneous-move tournament







Case 1: Let ∆w<4k¯ ε2. Then we can distinguish three subcases.
• Suppose that eA²[0,e ∗]. Since eA ≤ e∗ implies e∗




B intersects with the left-hand tail of the triangular density function
17(times ∆w)) and we have an interior solution described by (A1) and




eA +2 ¯ ε
∆w +4 k¯ ε2. (A3)
Note that e∗
B is linearly increasing in eA with e∗




• Suppose that eA²[e∗,2¯ ε]. Since eA ≥ e∗ implies e∗




intersects with the right-hand tail of the triangular density function
(times ∆w) )a n da ni n t e r i o rs o l u t i o ni sg i v e nb y( A 1 )t o g e t h e rw i t h




2¯ ε − eA
4k¯ ε2 − ∆w
. (A4)
Note that e∗
B is linearly decreasing in eA with e∗
B (e∗)=e∗ and e∗
B (2¯ ε)=
0.
• Suppose that eA ≥ 2¯ ε. Then we do not have an interior solution and
agent B optimally chooses
e
∗
B =0 . (A5)
Case 2: Let ∆w ≥ 4k¯ ε2.T h e ne∗ ≥ 2¯ ε and we can distinguish two subcases.
• Suppose that eA²[0,e ∗]. Since eA ≤ e∗ implies e∗
B ≥ eA,t h eo p t i m a l
eﬀort e∗




eA +2 ¯ ε
∆w +4 k¯ ε2.
10Note that EUB (eA,e ∗
B (eA)) >E U B (eA,0) iﬀ ∆w(eA +2 ¯ ε)
2 > 0 which is always
satisﬁed.
18Note that this interior solution requires EUB (eA,e ∗
B (eA)) ≥ EUB (eA,0)
to hold. Using agent B’s best response function, this condition is sat-
isﬁed as long as
eA ≤ ¯ eA :=
2¯ ε




2∆w2 +8 ∆wk¯ ε2
´
with ¯ eA ∈ [2¯ ε,e ∗].A g a i n ,e∗




• Suppose that eA >e ∗. Since the left-hand tail of the triangular density
is steeper than the marginal cost function, we do not have an interior




(2) Agent A’s optimal eﬀort e∗
A:
Given tournament prizes w1 and w2 agent A chooses e∗
A to maximize
his expected utility, taking into account agent B’s optimal response e∗
B (eA).
Using the ﬁrst-order condition agent A will act according to










Note that the second-order condition for an interior solution is always satis-



















− τk<0. Using the argumentation above, we can distin-
guish two possible situations:
Case 1: Let ∆w<4k¯ ε2. Then we have three possibilities:
• Suppose that e∗





∆w+4k¯ ε2,a n dt h e




∆w +4 k¯ ε
2¢2 .








∈ (0,4k¯ ε2) which can be rewritten as
τ ≥
4∆wk¯ ε2
(∆w +4 k¯ ε2)
2 := ˆ τ1(∆w).






τ∆w2 +( 2 τ − 1)4∆wk¯ ε2 +1 6 τk2¯ ε4 (A7)





∆w +4 k¯ ε2 =: ˆ τ2(∆w)
to hold. Furthermore, we have ˆ τ2(∆w) > ˆ τ1(∆w) for all parameter
constellations, and ˆ τ2(∆w) > 1
4 for ∆w<4k¯ ε2. Altogether, a feasible
interior solution described by (A7) will hold iﬀ τ ≥ ˆ τ2(∆w).T h e
corresponding expected utility is given by
EUA,(I) = w2 +
8τ∆wk2¯ ε4
τ∆w2 +( 2 τ − 1)4∆wk¯ ε2 +1 6 τk2¯ ε4. (A8)







2τ¯ ε∆w(4k¯ ε2 + ∆w)
τ∆w2 +( 2 τ − 1)4∆wk¯ ε2 +1 6 τk2¯ ε4
with an expected utility
EUB,(I) = w2 +
∆w
τ2 (∆w +2 k¯ ε2)(4k¯ ε2 + ∆w)
3 − 8∆wτk¯ ε2 (4k¯ ε2 + ∆w)
2 +1 6 ∆w2k2¯ ε4
(τ∆w2 +( 2 τ − 1)4∆wk¯ ε2 +1 6 τk2¯ ε4)
2 .
If, on the other hand, the second-order condition is not satisﬁed or the
interior solution is not feasible, we have a corner solution. Comparing
20agent A’s expected utilities for eA =0and eA = e∗ yields
EUA (0,e
∗
B (0)) = w2 + ∆w
8k2¯ ε4
(∆w +4 k¯ ε2)
2




∗)) = w2 + ∆w











⇔ ∆wτ +4 τk¯ ε
2 − 2k¯ ε
2 < 2k¯ ε
2√
1+4 τ. (A9)
If the left-hand side of inequality (A9) is negative, the inequality will
always hold. Otherwise we obtain
τ <
4k¯ ε2 (∆w +8 k¯ ε2)
(∆w +4 k¯ ε2)
2 .
Since the right-hand side of this inequality is greater than ˆ τ2(∆w),
(A9) always holds for τ < ˆ τ2(∆w). Hence, agent A optimally chooses
the corner solution e∗







∗)) = w2 + ∆w
4k¯ ε2 − ∆w
8k¯ ε2
• Suppose that e∗
A²[e∗,2¯ ε]. Then eA >e ∗

































τ∆w2 − (2τ − 1)4∆wk¯ ε2 +1 6 τk2¯ ε4 (A10)
21and
EUA,(II) = w2 + ∆w
τ∆w2 − (2τ − 1)4∆wk¯ ε2 +8 τk2¯ ε4
τ∆w2 − (2τ − 1)4∆wk¯ ε2 +1 6 τk2¯ ε4. (A11)
Note that the denominator of (A10) and (A11) is always positive. The















8∆wk¯ ε2 − ∆w2 − 8k2¯ ε4 =: ˆ τ3(∆w).
Moreover, note that e∗
A described by (A10) is always smaller than 2¯ ε,
but e∗
A >e ∗ iﬀ
τ <
4k¯ ε2
4k¯ ε2 − ∆w
=: ˆ τ4(∆w).






2τ¯ ε∆w(4k¯ ε2 − ∆w)
τ∆w2 − (2τ − 1)4∆wk¯ ε2 +1 6 τk2¯ ε4.
and
EUB,(II) = w2 +
2τ2∆wk¯ ε2 (4k¯ ε2 − ∆w)
3
(τ∆w2 − 8∆wk¯ ε2τ +4 ∆wk¯ ε2 +1 6 τk2¯ ε4)
2.
• Suppose that e∗
A > 2¯ ε. To induce e∗
B =0 , A will choose
e
∗
A =2 ¯ ε (A12)
to maximize expected utility which gives
EUA,(III) = w2 + ∆w
∆w − 2τk¯ ε2
∆w
. (A13)
B’s expected utility then of course is EUB,(III) = w2.
Comparing (A13) and (A11) yields
EUA,(III) <E U A,(II) ⇔− 2τ
2k¯ ε
2 ¡
∆w − 4k¯ ε
2¢2 < 0
22which is always true. Hence, agent A never prefers preemption under ∆w<
4k¯ ε2. We know that for τ < ˆ τ2(∆w) there is no feasible interior solu-
tion e∗
A²[0,e ∗]. Therefore, we have to compare EUA (e∗,e ∗
B (e∗)) = w2 +
∆w4k¯ ε2−τ∆w
8k¯ ε2 and EUA,(II).11 We obtain
w2 + ∆w
4k¯ ε2 − τ∆w
8k¯ ε2 <w 2 + ∆w
τ∆w2 − (2τ − 1)4∆wk¯ ε2 +8 τk2¯ ε4
τ∆w2 − (2τ − 1)4∆wk¯ ε2 +1 6 τk2¯ ε4
⇔− ∆w
¡
∆wτ − 4τk¯ ε
2 +4 k¯ ε
2¢2 < 0,
w h i c hi sa l w a y ss a t i s ﬁed. For τ > ˆ τ2(∆w), we have to compare (A8) and
(A11):


















this inequality holds for all values of ∆w, k and ¯ ε.
F o ra l lo t h e rv a l u e so fτ we have 4τ −3τ2 −1 < 0, and the inequality can be




3τ2 − 4τ +1
τ
.
Rearranging this inequality gives
τ ∈ (ˆ τ5(∆w),ˆ τ6(∆w))
with ˆ τ5(∆w)=
4k¯ ε2














16k2¯ ε4 + ∆w2
´
.






Moreover, ˆ τ6(0) = 1 and
∂ˆ τ1(∆w)
∂∆w > 0 , ∀∆w. Furthermore, ˆ τ3(∆w) >
ˆ τ6(∆w) and ˆ τ4(∆w) > ˆ τ6(∆w) (∀ ∆w<4k¯ ε2). To summarize, for τ ∈
[ˆ τ2(∆w),ˆ τ6(∆w)] agent A again optimally chooses (A10), but for τ > ˆ τ6(∆w)
he switches to (A7).
Case 2: Let ∆w ≥ 4k¯ ε2. Then we have to consider two possibilities:
11Note that ˆ τ2(∆w) < ˆ τ4(∆w) and ˆ τ2(∆w) < ˆ τ3(∆w) for all parameter constellations
∆w<4k¯ ε2.
23• Suppose that e∗
A²[0,e ∗]. Then e∗




∆w +4 k¯ ε
2¢2 (A14)
is satisﬁed as long as τ ≥ 1/4 or if τ < 1/4 and ∆w ≥ k¯ ε2
2τ (4 − 8τ +
4
√
1 − 4τ) ⇔ τ ≥ ˆ τ1(∆w). Recall that ˆ τ2(∆w) > ˆ τ1(∆w) for all
parameter constellations. Hence, again τ ≥ ˆ τ2(∆w) ensures a fea-
sible interior solution where agent A chooses e∗
A according to (A7)
and has an expected utility given by EUA,(I) (see (A8)). However,




and EUA (e∗,e ∗
B (e∗)) = w2 + ∆w4k¯ ε2−τ∆w
8k¯ ε2 .
• Suppose that eA >e ∗. Then agent B optimally chooses e∗
B =0and
agent A will choose e∗
A = e∗ resulting in an expected utility
EUA (e
∗,0) = w2 + ∆w
8k¯ ε2 − τ∆w
8k¯ ε2 . (A15)
For τ < ˆ τ2(∆w),w eh a v et oc o m p a r eEUA (e∗,e ∗
B (e∗)) = w2 + ∆w4k¯ ε2−τ∆w
8k¯ ε2
and EUA (e∗,0) (according (A15)). The comparison immediately shows that
EUA (e∗,0) >E U A (e∗,e ∗
B (e∗)), ∀∆w,τ,k,¯ ε. Hence, agent A chooses pre-
emption for suﬃciently small values of τ.F o rτ ≥ ˆ τ2(∆w), comparing (A8)
and (A15) shows that there exist two critical values
ˆ τ7 (∆w)=
³
8k¯ ε2 +6 ∆w − 2
p
(16k2¯ ε4 +2 4 ∆wk¯ ε2 + ∆w2)
´
k¯ ε2




8k¯ ε2 +6 ∆w +2
√
16k2¯ ε4 +2 4 ∆wk¯ ε2 + ∆w2¢
k¯ ε2
∆w(∆w +4 k¯ ε2)
with
∂ˆ τi(∆w)
∂∆w < 0,i=7 ,8 for all ∆w ≥ 4k¯ ε2 such that for all τ ∈ [ˆ τ7 (∆w),ˆ τ8 (∆w)]
EUA,(I) <E U A (e
∗,0).
24Note that ˆ τ7 (∆w) < ˆ τ2(∆w) < ˆ τ8 (∆w) ,∀∆w,τ,k,¯ ε,a n dt h a te∗
A according
to (A7) satisﬁes e∗
A ≤ ¯ eA for ∆w ≥ 4k¯ ε2. Therefore, if τ ∈ [ˆ τ2(∆w),ˆ τ8(∆w)]
agent A again prefers preemption, but for τ > ˆ τ8(∆w) he optimally chooses
e∗
A according to (A7).












∆w(∆w+4k¯ ε2) ≡ ˆ τ8 (∆w) if ∆w ≥ 4k¯ ε2
(A16)
completes the proof.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :
First, consider the case of ∆w<4k¯ ε2 and τ ≤ ˆ τ(∆w) where ˆ τ(∆w) is
given by (A16). Hence, using the expected utilities that have been computed
in the proof of Proposition 2, we must show that EUA,(II) >E U B,(II) in the
relevant range. We get









































Hence, the condition τ < ρ2(∆w) must hold. As we have ρ2(∆w) > ˆ τ6(∆w)
and ˆ τ6(∆w) ≥ τ for ∆w<4k¯ ε2, this condition is always satisﬁed.
25Next, we have to consider the preemption case with ∆w ≥ 4k¯ ε2 and
τ < ˆ τ(∆w).S i n c e a g e n t A receives EUA (e∗,0) >w 2 according to (A15)
and agent BE U B = w2, we immediately obtain that A’s expected utility is
greater than B’s one.
Finally, consider the case of τ > ˆ τ(∆w) for the full range of ∆w.H e r e ,
we must have
EUA,(I) <E U B,(I)
⇔
¡









∆w +2 k¯ ε
2¢¡
∆w +6 k¯ ε
2¢
τ +1 6 ∆wk
2¯ ε
4 > 0.
The right-hand side of this inequality again characterizes a parabola open to



















It suﬃces to show that the condition τ > ρ4(∆w) holds ∀∆w.A sρ4(∆w) <
ˆ τ (∆w), ∀∆w, and we have τ > ˆ τ(∆w) this condition always holds.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :









B − ∆w − 2w2 (A17)
=

   
   
8∆wk¯ ε3+2τ¯ ε∆w(4k¯ ε2+∆w)
τ∆w2+(2τ−1)4∆wk¯ ε2+16τk2¯ ε4 − ∆w − 2w2 if τ > ˆ τ(∆w)
8∆wk¯ ε3+2τ¯ ε∆w(4k¯ ε2−∆w)
τ∆w2−(2τ−1)4∆wk¯ ε2+16τk2¯ ε4 − ∆w − 2w2 if τ ≤ ˆ τ(∆w) and ∆w<4k¯ ε2
∆w
2¯ εk − ∆w − 2w2 if τ ≤ ˆ τ(∆w) and ∆w ≥ 4k¯ ε2
The principal maximizes π according to (A17) subject to the relevant re-
striction on ∆w and the two agents’ participation constraints EUi(e∗
i) ≥ ¯ u
26(i = A,B).12 Obviously, the principal chooses w2 so that the agent with the
lower expected utility is just indiﬀerent between accepting the contract or
not, that is, his participation constraint is binding. Using our comparison
of expected utilities above and solving for w2 then yields the following three
cases:
• If τ > ˆ τ(∆w),a g e n tA’s reservation constraint becomes binding and
we have
πI (∆w)=
8∆wk¯ ε3 +2 τ¯ ε∆w(4k¯ ε2 + ∆w)





τ∆w2 +( 2 τ − 1)4∆wk¯ ε2 +1 6 τk2¯ ε4
¶
.
Solving the principal’s proﬁtf o rt h eo p t i m a lw a g es p r e a d∆w∗ = f (τ)
shows that τ = f−1 (∆w∗) is strictly decreasing, i.e. the higher the costs
for agent A, the smaller the optimal wage spread ∆w∗.13 In particular,
∆w∗ < 4k¯ ε2.
• If τ ≤ ˆ τ(∆w) and ∆w<4k¯ ε2,a g e n tB’s reservation constraint is
12Note that here and in the following the agents’ incentive constraints e∗
A and e∗
B are
directly inserted into the principal’s objective function and the two agents’ participation
constraints.




2(4k¯ ε2+∆w)(∆w3+12∆w2k¯ ε2+64k2¯ ε4∆w−8∆wk¯ ε3−32k2¯ ε5) with
Θ = ∆w3 − 2∆w2¯ ε +8 k¯ ε2 ¡
2k¯ ε3 +2 ∆wk¯ ε2 + ∆w2¢
Ψ =( ¯ ε − ∆w)∆w4¯ ε
−2k¯ ε3 ¡
(3 + 2¯ εk)∆w4 − 4∆wk¯ ε2 ¡
16k2¯ ε4 + ∆w2¢¢
+2k¯ ε3 ¡
8∆w2k¯ ε3 ¡
6k¯ ε +4 k2¯ ε2 − 1
¢




8∆wk¯ ε3 +2 τ¯ ε∆w(4k¯ ε2 − ∆w)




2τ2∆wk¯ ε2 (4k¯ ε2 − ∆w)
3








− ∆w − 2¯ u.
Since πIII (∆w) is monotonically decreasing because of 2k¯ ε > 1 (see
condition (10)), the optimal wage spread is given by ∆w∗ =4 k¯ ε2 and
the principal’s proﬁt is negative: πIII (4k¯ ε2)=−2¯ ε(2k¯ ε − 1)−2¯ u<0.
To summarize, the principal always chooses ∆w∗ < 4k¯ ε2 for all τ ≥ 0.
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Figure 2: The agents’ optimal behavior 
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